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Citizen Suits under the Endangered Species Act
CITIZEN SUITS UNDER
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT:
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT EXPANDS




The Klamath Project, lo-
cated in northern California and
southern Oregon, consists of a
series of lakes, rivers, dams, and
irrigation canals. 2 The Project is one
of the federal government's oldest
reclamation schemes and is home to
the Lost River Sucker and Shortnose
Sucker, two species of endangered
fish. 3 These fish are at the center of
a controversy that has ranch
operators and irrigation districts
claiming a competing interest in
waters which the Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) has determined are
necessary for the preservation of
endangered species.'
The Endangered Species
Act (ESA) was promulgated in 1973
to recognize endangered and threat-
ened species and to determine their
critical habitats in order to prevent
extinction.5 The ESA requires any
federal agency that proposes a
course of action that may affect a
threatened or endangered species to
first consult with the FWS before
taking such action." If the FWS
finds that the species will be
adversely affected by the agency
action, a biological opinion will be
issued which details the "reasonable
and prudent alternatives" which the
agency might take to avoid such
harm.'
In Bennett v. Spear, the
United States Supreme Court
examined the issue of standing to
question a biological opinion which
may affect economic, commercial,
and aesthetic interests.8  The
Supreme Court sought to resolve a
conflict among the circuits over the
ESA's citizen-suit provision and its
application to the zone-of-interests
test.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1992, the Bureau of Recla-
mation ("Bureau"), following the
ESA guidelines, notified the Fish and
Wildlife Service ("FWS") that the
operation of the Klamath Project
might adversely affect the Lost
River Sucker and the Shortnose
Sucker ("suckers"). 9  The FWS
issued a biological opinion that found
that long-term operation of the
Klamath Project might endanger the
suckers and their habitat. 0 Conse-
quently, the FWS recommended that
the Bureau of Reclamation maintain
a minimum water level in specific
reservoirs in order to protect the
species."
Petitioners, 2 ranchers and wa-
ter districts in Oregon, concerned
that the FWS's recommendations
might adversely affect their inter-
ests, brought suit against the regional
director and director of the FWS, as
well as the Secretary of the Interior
("Secretary")." They contended
that the drastic reduction in available
irrigation water would irreparably
harm their use of the waterways for
recreational, aesthetic, and com-
mercial purposes.' 4 Further, peti-
tioners asserted that there was no
need to implement minimum water
levels as the suckers were not
endangered by the Project." Peti-
tioners claimed "there [was] no
commercially or scientifically avail-
1 17 S.Ct. 1154 (1997).
1Id. at 1159.
'Id. The Shortnose Sucker and Lost River Sucker were listed as endangered by the Secretary of the Interior in 1988. See 53 Fed.Reg.27130-
27133 (1988).
4 Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1159-60.
' See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1973).
'See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(aX2).
'See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(bX3XA).
' Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1158-59.
9 Id. at 1159.
10 Id.
"Id.
'Id. Two Oregon water districts, Langell Valley and Horsefly, that receive water from the Klamath Project and two ranch operators,
Bennett and Giordano, filed suit under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA for declaratory and injunctive relief. Petitioners' Brief at *ii,
1996 WL 277131.
13 Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1159.
4 Id. at 1160.
" Id. at 1159-60.
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able evidence indicating that the
restrictions on lake levels imposed in
the Biological Opinion [would] have
any beneficial effect on the
population of suckers."' 6
In their complaint, petitioners
asserted three claims for relief. The
first two claims alleged that the
minimum water levels imposed by
the FWS violated § 7 of the ESA.'
The third claim alleged that the
imposition of minimum water levels
constituted an "implicit determina-
tion of critical habitat" for the
endangered suckers, which violated
§ 4 of the ESA,'" in that it did not
account for the possible economic
impact.' 9 In each of their claims,
petitioners asserted that the FWS's
actions violated the Administrative
Procedure Act's ("APA") prohibi-
tion against agency action which is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law."2 0
The District Court of Oregon
dismissed the claim, finding that the
petitioners lacked standing since
their commercial and recreational
interests did not fall within the zone-
of-interests protected by the ESA.21
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed." The Ninth
Circuit stated that the zone-of-
interests test limited review under
the citizen-suit provision of the
ESA,23 as well as the APA, to those
individuals who had an environmen-
tal interest in the preservation of
endangered species.2 4
The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether the petitioners lacked
standing under the zone-of-interests
test.25 After reviewing the
petitioners' claims, the Supreme
Court reversed the Court of
Appeals. The Court concluded
that the zone-of-interests test
allowed any person to bring a claim
under the citizen-suit provision of
the ESA, as well as under the APA,
if Article III requirements were
met." The Court concluded that the
petitioners had claimed sufficient
injury in fact as a result of the
FWS's biological opinion to bring a
claim against the respondents."
M. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The requirements of standing
have their origins in Article III of the
U.S. Constitution.29 Article III
requires a plaintiff to show that (1)
he or she has suffered an "injury in
fact;" (2) "a causal connection
[exists] between the injury and the
conduct," in other words, the injury
must be "fairly traceable" to the acts
of the defendant; and (3) the injury
will likely be "redressed by a
favorable decision."30
While Article III provides the
minimum standing requirement,
courts have often applied other
prudential requirements to grant or
deny standing to plaintiffs.3' One
such prudential standing test is the
zone-of-interests doctrine, first em-
ployed employed in Association of
Data Processing Serv. Org. v.
Camp.32 Data Processing requires
a court to inquire into "whether the
interest sought to be protected by
"Id. at 1160.
"Id. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(aX2), which details the procedure which federal agencies must follow in order to insure that any action
"authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency" does not threaten an endangered species. The petitioners contended that the biological
opinion violated the ESA as there was no direct evidence to support the Secretary's finding that the suckers were placed at a greater risk
of extinction as a result of fluctuating water levels. Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915, 916 (9th Cir. 1995).
"See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(bX2). (requiring that the economic impact of the detennination in the biological opinion be considered).
"Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1160.
2old. See5 U.S.C. § 706(2XA), (1994).
21Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1160.
22 Id.
- Id. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g). Section 1540(g) states in relevant part that "any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf.. .to
enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued under
authority thereof." Id.
24Bennett, 117 S.Ct.at 1160.
2 Id.2 1 Id. at 1169.
" Id. "Person" means "an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any other private entity, or any officer, employee,
agent, department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or political subdividion of a State, or of any
foreign government; any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State; or any other entitiy subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States." See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13).
2Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1169.
29U.S. Cos4sT. art. M, § 2, cl. 1.
See Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
" Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1161. Prudential requirements are "judicially self-imposed limits" and are capable ofbeing altered by Congress. Id.
(quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,751).
32397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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the complainant is arguably within
the zone-of-interest to be protected
or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in ques-
In Data Processing, the
plaintiffs challenged a ruling by the
Comptroller of the Currency that
allowed national banks to sell data-
processing services to other banks
and bank customers. 4 The Court
of Appeals held that the plaintiffs
had suffered an injury but denied
them standing to complain of such
injury under § 4 of the Bank Service
Corporation Act.s The Court in-
terpreted § 10 of the APA as
requiring either a showing of a legal
interest36 or an explicit provision in
the relevant statute permitting suit
by the affected party. 7
The Supreme Court did not
construe the provision so narrowly,
instead it found the association to be
"within that class of 'aggrieved'
persons who, under § 702, are
entitled to judicial review of
'agency action."' 3  In doing so, the
Court noted that the National Bank
Act itself made no mention of
judicial review or aggrieved indi-
viduals3" but decided there need not
be an explicit statement of congres-
sional purpose in the statute in order
to confer standing upon economi-
cally-injured plaintiffs.'
The Court concluded that
Congress had not desired that every
individual suffering an injury in fact
be allowed to bring suit.' The Court
suggested that Congress should
devise the zone-of-interests test to
limit standing to those individuals
whose interests were within the
statute in dispute. 2 Those interests
may be economic, as well as
"aesthetic, conservational, and rec-
reational." 3 In considering such
interests, the Court expanded the
class of persons who could seek
review under the APA.
After its initial introduction in
1970, the zone-of-interests test was
infrequently applied.45 However,
the test gained new life in 1987 when
the United States Supreme Court, in
Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n,4
attempted to further clarify the
prudential requirement. In Clarke, a
trade association, which repre-
sented securities dealers and bro-
kers, brought suit alleging violations
of the McFadden Act.47  These
violations resulted from the Comp-
troller of the Currency's approval of
the requests oftwo national banks to
open discount brokerage offices in
their branch locations.48
The Court in Clarke, following
the zone-of-interests test set out in
Data Processing, held that the
trade association had standing to
bring a claim under the Act.49 The
Court dismissed petitioner's argu-
ment that the congressional purpose
of the Act was not to safeguard
those involved in the securities
market.s0 The Court stated that the
essential inquiry in determining
standing under the APA is "whether
Congress 'intended for [a particular]
'lId. at 153.
" Id. at 151.
"Id. at 153.
36Id. at 153-54. The legal interest test evolved out of cases such as Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939), in which
power companies sought to enjoin TVA from operating, claiming that the statute from which it derived its existence was unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court denied standing because the right invaded was not classified as a legal one. Such legal rights included those claims based
on property, contract, tort, or statutory privilege. Tennessee Electric, 306 U.S. at 137-38. The Court in Data Processing determined that
the legal interest test went to the merits of the case, not to the question of standing. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153-54.
"Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153. The APA grants standing to a person "aggrieved by an agency action within the meaning ofa relevant
statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1964 ed., Supp IV.).
3 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 157.
"Id. at 154. The idea that no explicit statutory language is needed to confer standing has been upheld in other cases. See Japan Whaling
Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221, 231 (1986). ("A separate indication of congressional intent to make agency action
reviewable under the APA is not necessary, instead, the rule is that the cause of action for review of such action is available absent some
clear and convincing evidence of legislative intention to preclude review.") Id.
40 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154.
41 Id.
41 Id. at 153.
4 Id. at 154.
4 Id.
4 Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915 (91 Cir. 1995).
46479 U.S. 388 (1987).
4 1 Id. at 390-91. The McFadden Act, which restricts the activities in which national banks are specifically authorized to engage, is codified
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 36 & 81.
4 Clarke, 479 U.S. at 403.
49 Id.
so Id. at 399.
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class [of plaintiffs] to be relied upon
to challenge agency disregard of the
law',"i and that review should be
denied under the APA only if "the
plaintiff's interests are so marginally
related to or inconsistent with the
purposes implicit in the statute that it
cannot reasonably be assumed to
permit the suit." 52 Ultimately, the
Court stated its desire to have the
test remain a flexible requirement
for determining standing, with no
need for explicit congressional
action.53
Beyond applying the zone-of-
interests test as expressed in Data
Processing, the Clarke Court
broadened the zone-of-interests
test, holding that it was applicable to
claims under statutes other than the
APA.5 4 However, it cautioned that
the test should not be employed in
every case, as other statutes do not
have such generous review provi-
sions." The Court doubted the
possibility of providing a single
standard, as it would become too
generalized to provide any probative
value." Therefore, the Court
declined to comment on precisely
how the test might apply to non-
APA claims."
Minimal guidance from the
Supreme Court on the application of
the zone-of-interests test to non-
APA claims led to confusion among
the circuit courts on how and if the
zone-of-interests test should be used
in conjunction with the citizen-suit
provision of the ESA. Some courts
have held that the test does apply to
determine standing under the ESA,
while others have declined to apply
the test, opting to look only to Article
III to determine standing.58
One circuit that has declined to
apply the zone-of-interests test to
the citizen-suit provision ofthe ESA
is the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth
Circuit, in Defenders of Wildlife v.
Hodel,5 9 decided that a plaintiff
must meet only the requirements of
Article III to possess standing. In
Hodel, the plaintiffs brought an
action challenging a Department of
the Interior regulation which did not
require United States agencies
funding projects in foreign countries
to seek advice from the Secretary of
the Interior on the impact such
project may have on endangered
species." The District Court of
Minnesota dismissed the case for
lack of standing.61 The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed, holding that the citizen-suit
provision of the ESA allowed any
person to commence a suit against
one who is allegedly in violation of
the ESA. 62  The Court found
plaintiffs could bring such a claim
under the ESA if they met Article III
requirements of injury in fact,
causation, and redressability, as the
"any person" language in the statute
indicated congressional intent to
eliminate any further prudential
requirements.63
Other circuit courts have held
that the zone-of-interests test does
apply to the citizen-suit provision of
the ESA. The Ninth Circuit
addressed this issue in Mt. Graham
Red Squirrel v. Espy" and Pac.
N.W. Generating Coop. v.
Brown.65 The Circuit Court of the
District of Columbia also applied the
test in Idaho v. Interstate Com-
merce Comm'n."
In Mt. Graham, plaintiffs
sought an injunction to stop
construction of an observatory on
the University of Arizona campus,
fearing it might endanger the habitat
of the red squirrel.6 1 The Ninth
Circuit reversed the findings of both
lower court decisions and held that
the plaintiffs had standing under the
zone-of-interests test of the Ari-
zona-Idaho Conservation Act, as
they asserted an interest in the
preservation of endangered spe-
cies.68
In Pacific Northwest, plaintiffs
who purchased hydropower chal-
lenged an action that listed three
species of salmon as endangered.69
The United States District Court of





m Id. at 400.
57 Id.
3 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
5 851 F.2d 1035, 1038 (8- Cir. 1988).
"Id. at 1036.
61Id.
62 Id. at 1039.
63 Id. at 1039, n.2.
"986 F.2d 1568 (9' Cir. 1993).
a 38 F.3d 1058 (9-h Cir. 1994).
"35 F.3d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
6 Mt. Graham, 986 F.2d at 1569.
a Id. at 1570.
"Pacific Northwest, 38 F.3d at 1060.
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Oregon held that plaintiffs lacked
standing to bring suit under the
ESA. 0 The Court of Appeals,
however, held that the plaintiffs had
an economic stake in whether the
species was classified as endan-
gered, and reversed."
In Interstate Commerce
Comm 'n, three mining companies
and the state invoked the ESA to
challenge an order by the ICC that
allowed a company to abandon a
portion of track without first
cleaning up pollution left by the
railroad.72 The Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia held that
plaintiffs (mining companies) had
standing under the ESA to bring suit,
as they fell within that class of
individuals whom the APA seeks to
protect. 3 The Court found that the
plaintiff (state of Idaho) had a
proprietary interest in the affected
land, as well as an interest in the
preservation of endangered spe-
cies.74
In Bennett v. Spear,75 the
United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the
conflicting holdings of the Circuit
Courts.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Bennett, the Supreme Court
of the United States clarified the
citizen-suit provision ofthe ESA and
held the zone-of-interests test
applied to claims brought under the
ESA provision, allowing petitioners
to seek judicial review ofa biological
opinion if they asserted a competing
economic interest in the protected
areas.7 6
The Court began its analysis
with the question of standing." In
its unanimous opinion written by
Justice Scalia, the Court determined
that standing is both a constitutional
and a prudentially self-imposed
limitation onjurisdiction .7 Accord-
ing to the Court, Article III is the
"irreducible constitutional minimum
of standing" and cannot be modified
or abrogated by law.79 Unlike their
constitutional equivalent, prudential
requirements, which are judicially
self-imposed limits on the exercise
offederal jurisdiction, can be altered
by Congress.80 The Court stated
that the prudential standing require-
ment included the issue in dispute in
this case, specifically, whether the
petitioner's complaint must be
within the zone-of-interests to be
regulated or protected by statute or
constitutional guarantee.81
The Court explained that the
ESA's citizen-suit provision ex-
panded the zone-of- interests test to
include the economic, recreational,
and aesthetic interests of the
ranchers and irrigation districts.82 In
its analysis, the Court turned to the
wording ofthe citizen-suit provision
of the ESA.83 The Court observed
the pertinent portion ofthe provision
clearly states that "any person may
commence a civil suit."84 Accord-
ing to the Court, this wording is quite
broad, in that it does not clearly set
out any restrictions on who may
bring a suit under the ESA
provision.85 The Court explained its
willingness to take the words "any
person" for their face value by
turning to legislative intent." Since
the subject matter turned on
environmental issues in which most
people would have an interest, and
because the purpose ofthe provision
was to encourage enforcement, the
Court determined that the "any
person" provision applied to all
causes of action under § 1540(g).87
This included the petitioner's action
to prevent implementation of envi-
ronmental restrictions.88 The Court
concluded that the lower courts had
erred in holding that the petitioners
lacked standing to bring a claim
under the ESA.89
Because the lower courts found
7o Id. at 1062-63.
71 Id. at 1066.
72 Interstate Commerce, 35 F.3d at 588.
" Id. at 591.
7 Id. at 592.
7 117 S.Ct. 1154 (1997).
"Id. at 1154, 1169.
" Id. at 1160.
'Id. at 1161. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498 (1975)).
" Id. See supra note 30.
"0 Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1161. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,751 (1984)).
a Id. at 1161, 1163.
MId. at 1160.
83Id. at 1162. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(gXI).
' Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1162.
8s Id.
6 Id.
I Id. (The provision encourages enforcement by eliminating the amount-in-controversy requirement and the diversity-of-citizenship
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the government's zone-of-interests
ground to be dispositive, they did not
review the respondent's other
grounds for dismissal. The
Supreme Court, though, after
reviewing the lower courts' deci-
sion on standing under the ESA,
turned to these alternatives.90 The
government first contended that the
petitioners did not meet Article III
requirements for standing and,
therefore, lacked the ability to seek
judicial review.9'
The Supreme Court ruled that
petitioners had sufficient standing in
this case to seek judicial review.9
First, petitioners alleged general
facts that at the pleading stage were
sufficient to presume that they had
specific facts to support the injury
claim.93 In the Court's view, the
general claim that the amount of
available water would be reduced
was specific enough to show that
the petitioners could later produce
further details of precisely how they
would be impacted. 94 Second, the
petitioner's injury was "fairly
traceable" to the FWS's biological
opinion.9s Although the govern-
ment argued that the Bureau had
ultimate responsibility for determin-
ing how actions should proceed, the
Court found that the FWS's
biological opinion had a strong
coercive effect on the Bureau, as an
agency which disregards the opinion
and proceeds with its action does so
at its own peril." Third, the
plaintiffs injury could likely be
redressed because the Bureau
would not impose water restrictions
if the opinion would be set aside.9'
The Court also reviewed the
Government's claim that the ESA's
citizen-suit provision does not allow
judicial review of the petitioners'
claims." The Court found that the
petitioners' 16 U.S.C. § 1533 claim
could be reviewed under 16 U.S.C. §
1540, as the Secretary had an
obligation to consider the economic
impact of defining an area as a
critical habitat.9  Although the
ultimate decision was discretionary,
the decision-making procedures
which led up to the final determina-
tion were not, as he was required to
use all of the available scientific data
to determine relevant impact.'"
The Supreme Court next ana-
lyzed the government's argument
that a violation of § 7 of the ESA,
codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536, cannot
be reviewed under the ESA citizen-
suit provision.o'0 The Court looked to
§ 1540 to determine if it permitted
suit against the Secretary of the
Interior for any violation of the
ESA. 02 The Court concluded that it
did not. It interpreted the reference
to "violation" in § 1540(g)(1)(A) to
exclude a Secretary's maladminis-
tration, as it applied not to violations
by those who administer the law but
to violations by those who are
regulated by such law. 0 3 Further,
the Court asserted that it was
unlikely that the legislature's intent
was to impose criminal liability on
those in the administrative agency. 104
Although the petitioners' claim
under § 1536 may not be brought
under the ESA, the Court examined
whether such claims may be
authorized under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). 0 Under
the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 704, an
individual has a right to judicial
review of final agency action for
which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court.'" A court can
"set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law." 07
Looking to the APA, the Court
held that the petitioners' claim of a
0 Id.
9 Id. See supra note 30 and accompanying text for Article M requirements.
'
2Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1165.
9
'Id. at 1164. (citing Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S.
871, 889 (1990)) for the proposition that "on a motion to dismiss [a court] presumes that the general allegations embrace those specific
facts that are necessary to support the claim")).
94 Id.





'Id. "It is rudimentary administrative law that discretion as to the substance of the ultimate decision does not confer discretion to ignore
the required procedures of decisionmaking." See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,94-95(1943).
' Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1166.
102 Id.
10s Id. See supra note 23.
0" Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1166. Criminal liability is imposed under § 1540(b), which makes it a crime for "[any person [to] knowingly
violat[el any provision of [the ESA]," or under §I 1540(eX3), which "authorizes law enforcement personnel to 'make arrests without a
warrant for any violation of [the ESA]."' See 16 U.S.C. § 1540.
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violation of 16 U.S.C. § 1536 falls
within the APA and is subject to
judicial review.'" The Court found
that the petitioners' contention that
the FWS failed to use the best
available scientific evidence was
within the zone-of-interests sought
to be protected, as it safeguarded
individuals from economical jeop-
ardy determinations due to errone-
ous information.'"
The Court further rejected the
government's contention that a
biological opinion was not "final
agency action" under the APA."o
Concluding that the opinion had
direct legal consequences and was
not merely advisory, the Court
found the opinion to be the end result
of the agency's decision-making
process and thus a final action.'"
Accordingly, the Supreme Court
found that the petitioners fell within
the zone-of-interests sought to be
protected and could seek judicial
review of their claims under the
ESA and the APA.112
V. COMMENT
As a result of the decision in
Bennett, a party bringing a claim
under the citizen-suit provision of
the ESA can allege an interest that
is contrary to the preservation of
endangered species and still enjoy
standing."3 The Supreme Court's
interpretation provides a forum for
an aggrieved individual to protect an
interest harmed by an environmental
determination.
In examining 16 U.S.C. §
1540(g), the statutory language
seems to confer upon any person the
ability to bring suit ifhe or she alleges
any interest in the environment,
whether or not it is protective." 4 The
Supreme Court took such an
epariveagp1ac inBennett, but
other courts have not been so willing
to take the words "any person" at
face value. The Ninth Circuit has
refused in numerous cases to
expand environmental statutory
language to include those parties
whose injuries did not arise from an
interest in the environment."' In
Dan Caputo Co. v. Russian River
County Sanitation District, the
plaintiff was denied standing be-
cause he did not seek to vindicate
environmental concerns when he
asserted that the government's
noncompliance with the Clean
Water Act resulted in the loss of his
grant funds."' 6 In that statute, the
operative words were "any citi-
zen."117
Circuit courts, as well as many
respondents, argue that standing
should be granted only to those
parties with environmental con-
cerns. They contend that extending
the zone-of-interests to those who
have competing economic, com-
mercial, or aesthetic interests would
defeat the purpose of the ESA,
which is to protect threatened and
endangered species." 8  The Su-
preme Court in Bennett, however, in
its expansion ofthe zone-of-interests
test, took the approach of serving
and protecting the rights of parties
bringing suit under the environmental
statute. The citizen-suit provision
should not be so narrowly construed
to include only those who seek to
implement restrictions.
The Supreme Court in Bennett
stresseD the importance of a liberal
reading of the provision, since the
subject matter of the suit is the
environment, an area that should be
of interest to all individuals.1 9 The
citizen-suit provision of the ESA
eliminates the amount-in-contro-
versy requirement and the diversity-
of-citizenship requirement.12 The
provision also provides for the
recovery of litigation fees.121 Fur-
ther, the government has a right of
first refusal, in terms ofdiscretionary
prosecution of claims.122 According
to the Court, these factors are strong
evidence that "the obvious purpose
ofthe particular provision in question
is to encourage enforcement by so-
called 'private attorneys gen-
eral'." 23
Allowing a party who meets
Article III standing and alleges a
competing interest to have the case
" Id. at 1167-69.
1' Id. at 1168.
noId.
"I Id. at 1168-69.
"'Id. at 1169.
" Id.
" See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
"' See Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713 (9' Cir. 1993) (Court held plaintiffs lacked standing under
NEPA as the environmental purpose of the Act would not be served if suits based on purely economic claims were allowed).
"' 749 F.2d 571, 575 (9 Cir. 1984).
'" Id.
""See Dan Caputo, 749 F.2d 571 (91 Cir. 1984); Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915 (9* Cir. 1995).
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decided on the merits would not
interfere with the enforcement of
the statutory scheme developed
under the ESA. Instead, it might
encourage more careful inspection
and diligence in issuing biological
opinions. Greaterjudicial scrutiny of
agencies' ESA decision-making
powers in cases of overregulation
would provide a check on govern-
mental power. If individuals are
given a forum to question the basis of
an environmental opinion, there will
be further preservation of personal
rights, a safeguard from erroneous
agency decisions. More cases may
be brought under the ESA with the
expansion of the zone-of-interests
test, but Article III will ensure that
such cases have a solid foundation
for trial.
This expansive view of the
zone-of-interests test may have
implications beyond the environ-
mental arena in the future. Several
circuits have already applied the
Court's decision to contexts beyond
the ESA. For instance, in Davis v.
Philadelphia Housing Authority, the
Third Circuit reexamined the Bennett
decision in the area of the Lead-
Based Poisoning and Prevention
Act.124 The Court of Appeals held
that the family of a young boy, who
had suffered brain damage as a
result of lead-based paint in the
home, had standing under the zone-
of-interests test to bring a claim
against the Federal Housing Author-
ity.12
5
In Davis, the specific statutory
language of the Act did not directly
confer standing upon the plain-
tiffs.' 26  However, the Court
determined they had a sufficient
basis on which to proceed, as their
claims were closely related to the
purpose of the Act.127 In addition,
the family's claims would promote
enforcement of the Act, rather than
interfere with statutory schemes.'
Moreover, their specific rights could
only be protected by bringing suit
under this Act.129 The Court cited
Bennett as the primary authority for
its expansive view of the zone-of-
interests test.s 0
The scope of Bennett has not
been clearly defined. How much of
an impact the case will have on
future statutory applications of the
zone-of-interests test is difficult to
determine. The Supreme Court
does caution that some limits must be
placed on the prudential standing
requirement. Beyond the ESA
setting, however, the situations in
which the test may be invoked are
too varied to outline a workable set of
guidelines. Further direction can
only come from judicial application
of the zone-of-interests test in future
environmental cases and other
contexts. If courts in other statutory
contexts follow the Bennett deci-
sion, deserving plaintiffs who have
been injured by agency action may
be granted the opportunity to seek
judicial review, whereas before they
were left without remedy.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the environmental context
and beyond, the Supreme Court's
holding in Bennett is receiving a
great deal of attention. In the area of
the environment, it may have a
profound effect on the variety of
economic, commercial, and aes-
thetic claims brought under the ESA.
Even claims that are not capable of
being brought under the citizen-suit
provision of the ESA may be
enforceable under the APA, as the
Court found the citizen-suit provision
does not preclude such review. The
Supreme Court's expansive decision
in Bennett v. Spear broadens the
plaintiffs path to judicial review.
124 121 F.3d 92 (3rd Cir. 1997).
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